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Abstract
An adequate formulation of collective intentionality is crucial for understanding
group activity and for modeling the mental state of participants in such activities.
Although work on collective intentionality in philosophy, artiﬁcial intelligence, and
cognitive science has many points of agreement, several key issues remain under
debate. This paper argues that the dynamics of intention—in particular, the inter-
related processes of plan-related group decision making and intention updating—
play crucial roles in an explanation of collective intentionality. Furthermore, it is in
these dynamic aspects that coordinated group activity diﬀers most from individual
activity. The paper speciﬁes a model of the dynamics of agent intentions in the
context of collaborative activity. Its integrated treatment of group decision making
and coordinated updating of group-related intentions ﬁlls an important gap in prior
accounts of collective intentionality, thus helping to resolve a long-standing debate
about the nature of intentions in group activity. The paper also deﬁnes an architec-
ture for collaboration-capable computer agents that satisﬁes the constraints of the
model and is a natural extension of the standard architecture for resource-bounded
agents operating as individuals. The new architecture is both more principled and
more complete than prior architectures for collaborative multi-agent systems.
? The research reported in this paper was supported in part by National Science
Foundation grants IIS-0222892 and IIS-9978343 to Harvard University.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science1 Introduction
There is broad agreement in philosophy, artiﬁcial intelligence and cognitive
science [3, 42, 16, 17, 50, 49, 20, 30, 27, 12] that the collective, joint activity of
a group is more than the simple sum of the domain-oriented actions performed
by the individuals in that group: coordinating activities, typically including
some communicative actions, are required. There is also cross-ﬁeld agreement
that the plans that underlie the collective or collaborative activity of a group
involve more than the simple sum of the plans of the individual group mem-
bers concerning their own actions and that the simple sum of the intentions
of the individuals toward their own actions does not fully capture collective
intentionality. However, there is a marked divergence in claims about the con-
structs needed to ﬁll the gap between the whole and any simple collection of
single-agent actions, intentions and plans.
Several philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that collective in-
tentionality requires a diﬀerent kind of mental-state construct, namely an
intentional attitude that although individually held is diﬀerent from and not
reducible to an “ordinary” intention. For instance, Searle [43] claims that, “In
addition to singular intentionality there is also collective intentionality,” where
“the intentionality that exists in each individual head has the form ‘we in-
tend’.” He argues that collective intentionality “is a biologically primitive phe-
nomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something else.”
Similarly, Tuomela [50] argues for individually held “we-intentions” which he
describes as “agreement-based social intentions that agents have in situations
of joint action” with content that “can be taken to be something like ‘to do X
jointly’ or ‘we to do X jointly’.” He also distinguishes intending in the we-mode
from intending in the I-mode, and argues that “the we-mode is not reducible
to the I-mode and these modes may be in conﬂict” [48]. Gilbert [12] presents
a “plural subject” account of collective intentionality in which agents form
a joint commitment to “intend as a body.” She argues that the individual
“commitment shares” are not, and do not require the existence of, personal
commitments. In the remaining discussion, we will use the term “plural stance”
to distinguish approaches like these, which require a separate, new category
of intentions that have plural subjects.
Several of the accounts taking a plural stance argue further that agreements
and the obligations they entail play a central role in distinguishing the mental
state required for collective intentionality from that required for individual ac-
tivity. In particular, they claim that obligations serve to bind the participants
of a group activity together in coordinating and pursuing their collaborative
endeavor. For instance, in Tuomela’s account of “full-blown, agreement-based
joint intention” [50], agreements entail obligations on the participants to adopt
certain speciﬁed relevant intentions. Similarly, in Gilbert’s account [12], joint
2commitments have inherent obligations on agents to provide appropriate ac-
tion. Castelfranchi [5] argues for “social commitments”, which involve similar
obligations, rights and entitlements.
Some computational approaches to formalizing collaboration or designing com-
putational agents capable of collaboration [30, 26, 46] also take the plural
stance. They employ notions of joint intention that although reducible to sets
of individually held attitudes, reduce to something other than “ordinary” in-
tentions.
In contrast to accounts taking the plural stance, Bratman [3] claims that no
new kind of intention is required for characterizing collective action and in-
tentionality and that collaboration can occur in the absence of any initiating
agreement or mutual obligation. He argues that an interlocking web of beliefs,
mutual beliefs and ordinary intentions is suﬃcient. To achieve the coordina-
tion and commitment needed for collective, cooperative activities, his account
requires that the content of each participant’s group-related intention “that
we [perform the joint action] J” include the modiﬁer “in accordance with
and because of [our intentions] and meshing subplans of [our intentions].”
Some computational approaches to formalizing collaboration and construct-
ing collaborative multi-agent systems also deploy solely ordinary intentional
attitudes [20, 16, 17, 27]. In the remaining discussion, we will use the term
“singular stance” to refer to approaches like these that use only intentions
having a singular subject. In singular-stance approaches, the object of an in-
tention may be a group action; that is, a singular subject intends, but the
content of the intention—i.e., what is intended—may have a plural subject
(e.g., that we do something).
This paper argues that the singular and plural stances can be reconciled, but
only through careful consideration of the dynamics of intentions in collabo-
rative activities. An adequate account of these dynamics requires not only
the modiﬁcation of theories of collaboration but also the redesign of architec-
tures for collaboration-capable, resource-bounded computer agents. To address
these needs, the paper extends the SharedPlans formalization of collaborative
activity to accommodate more completely the dynamics of intention. In partic-
ular, it deﬁnes a model, the “coordinated cultivation of SharedPlans” (CCSP)
model, which provides a more comprehensive treatment than prior work of
the interactions of decision making and intention updating in group activity.
It then articulates an architecture for collaboration-capable computer agents
based on the CCSP model. The major theoretical contribution of the CCSP
model is to enable an explanation of collective intentionality that rests on
purely singular-stance constructs while capturing the essential properties ar-
gued for in accounts taking the plural stance. The major contribution from
a computational perspective is to provide a more general architecture for
collaboration-capable agent design.
3The next section of the paper brieﬂy describes the SharedPlans formaliza-
tion of collaborative activity [16, 17]. Section 3 presents the CCSP model and
the CCSP-based architecture for collaboration-capable computer agents. Of
special note, Section 3.2 highlights important diﬀerences between the dynam-
ics of intention in purely single-agent activity and collective group activity.
Section 4 shows that the CCSP model meets the requirements for collective
intentionality identiﬁed in prior singular- and plural-stance approaches and
compares the CCSP-based architecture to existing architectures for collabo-
rative, multi-agent systems.
2 Background
2.1 SharedPlans
Agents, whether people or computer systems, are resource bounded and the
worlds in which they operate are dynamic [4, 16]. Thus, for both individual
and multi-agent planning, it must be possible to form initial, incomplete plans
that may be expanded and changed over time. Partial plans typically include
intentions that are under-speciﬁed. For example, if a cook has not yet decided
whether to get tomatoes from the grocery store or the farmer’s market, his plan
to make Caprese salad will be incomplete and his intention “to make a Caprese
salad” under-speciﬁed. Likewise, if two friends have agreed to go to the movies,
but not yet decided which movie to see, their plan to go to the movies will be
incomplete, and whatever intentions represent their commitment “to go to the
movies” will be under-speciﬁed. As a result of such incompleteness, plans and
intentions related to actions, whether of individuals or groups, require that
means-ends reasoning, or planning, 1 be done and that decisions be made
about various aspects of the doing of those actions.
SharedPlans is a formal speciﬁcation of the mental-state requirements of par-
ticipants in a collaborative, group activity that addresses the need for partial-
ity in plans and the requisite commitment of agents to group decision-making
processes. 2 The speciﬁcation is given in terms of the intentions, beliefs and
1 The terms “means-ends reasoning” and “planning” are used by diﬀerent ﬁelds
and authors to refer to essentially the same process, namely the process of deter-
mining how to achieve a goal or objective (the “ends”) or do an action. This process
is sometimes characterized as determining the “sub-acts” that must be done (the
means) to perform a high-level action (“the ends”). In this paper we use the terms
interchangeably, typically choosing the one that best matches the most related re-
search.
2 SharedPlans was initially presented at a 1986 workshop [20]. The formalization
was signiﬁcantly generalized and revised in a subsequent set of papers [15, 16, 17,
4Agents have a SharedPlan to do α if and only if they hold the following
beliefs and intentions:
(1) individual intentions that the group perform α;
(2) mutual belief of a (partial) recipe for α;
(3) individual or group plans for the sub-acts in the (partial) recipe;
(4) intentions that the selected agents or subgroups succeed in doing their
sub-acts (for all sub-acts that have been assigned to some agent or
group); and
(5) [in the case of a partial SharedPlan] subsidiary commitments to group
decision-making processes aimed at completing the group’s partial
plan.
Fig. 1. The beliefs and intentions required for a SharedPlan
mutual beliefs of the participants. It deploys two intentional attitudes, intend-
ing to (do an action) and intending that (a proposition hold). Intentions-to
are used to represent an agent’s commitments to its own actions, whether
for individual ends or as part of a group activity. Such commitments in-
clude commitments toward reasoning about ways of accomplishing its intended
actions—that is, to planning. In contrast, intentions-that are used to represent
an agent’s commitments toward a group (or joint) activity and the actions of
its fellow participants in service of that activity. Such commitments lead an
agent to engage in a particular kind of plan-based reasoning, called intention
cultivation [17], that includes reasoning about other participants’ actions and
intentions and ways the agent could contribute to their success in the context
of the group activity.
The main constituents of the SharedPlans speciﬁcation are given informally
in Figure 1. The term “recipe”, used in the ﬁgure, refers to a way of doing
an action [36]. More speciﬁcally, a recipe for an action α is a set of actions
(or “sub-acts”) and constraints such that doing those actions under those
constraints constitutes doing α.
Each participant’s intention “that the group do α” (stated in Clause 1 of the
ﬁgure) is of special importance to collective action. In the remainder of this
paper, we refer to such intentions as group-activity-related intentions (or, GAR
intentions). The intention-cultivation process associated with an agent’s GAR
intention generates a set of decisions that the group must make if they are to
complete their plan for doing α. These “decision problems” include choosing
a recipe for the group activity, determining the agents or subgroups that will
be responsible for performing the sub-acts in the recipe, and selecting appro-
priate values for various other action parameters (e.g., the time at which the
action is to be done or the resources to be used in doing it). The Shared-
31, 22]. We use “SharedPlans” in this paper to refer to the formalization as reﬁned
through this progression.
5Plans speciﬁcation explicitly requires collaborating agents to be committed to
solving these decision problems together; that is, they must be committed to
reaching agreement (Clause 5). The SharedPlans formalization also includes
a set of axioms that stipulate various properties of intentions and constraints
among them [16, 17]. These axioms, together with intention-cultivation pro-
cesses deriving from agents’ GAR intentions, engender the cooperation and
coordination required for collective group activity.
2.2 The Reasoning–Choosing–Updating Cycle
Agents with a partial plan engage a centrally important three-phase cycle
of reasoning, choosing and updating. The SharedPlans formalization focuses
primarily on specifying the commitments of collaborating agents toward the
reasoning and choosing phases of this cycle, but does not explicitly address
the operational dynamics of making choices and subsequently updating inten-
tions. In the course of implementing collaboration-capable computer agents
according to the SharedPlans speciﬁcation [14], the second author recognized
the need to more directly address these operational dynamics [24]. First, there
must be a formal speciﬁcation of group decision making that makes explicit
what it means to reach agreement. Second, the participants must be commit-
ted not only to reaching agreement on decisions, but also to updating their
intentions to be in accordance with the agreed upon decisions; that is, the re-
sults of group decisions made in expanding a partial plan to a more complete
one must eventually be reﬂected in the individual intentions of each agent.
Although a signiﬁcant body of research has addressed the dynamics of inten-
tions in individual activity [39, 38, 41, 40, 28, 45, 33, 32], the inter-related
dynamics of decision making and intention updating in collaborative, multi-
agent activity has received scant attention. Computational approaches to the
problem of how participants initially form a collaborative team [6, 27, 25, 34,
inter alia] address the decision-making and intention-update question in that
context. Various implementations of collaborative multi-agent systems [26, 47,
37, 11, inter alia] have recognized the gap in coverage of dynamics in theories
of collaboration, with diﬀerent systems highlighting diﬀerent problems. How-
ever, the mechanisms used by these implementations to compensate for the
lack of theory have been limited in scope.
3 The Coordinated Cultivation of SharedPlans
The Coordinated Cultivation of SharedPlans (CCSP) model of the dynam-
ics of intention in collaborative, group activity provides a uniform treatment
6Agent Reasoning and
Communicative Capabilities
Commitments to Participate
in Group Decision-Making Processes
(Formally-Speciﬁed)
Group Decision-Making Mechanisms
Group Decsion-Making Process
Obligations to Adopt New
Intentions or Update Existing Intentions
Agents Adopt New Intentions
or Update Existing Intentions
GAR Intentions plus
Collective-Action Context
Group Decision
Fig. 2. An overview of group decision making in the CCSP model
of group decisions and extends the SharedPlans formalization to accommo-
date the inter-related and dynamic processes of group decision making and
intention updating. In so doing, the CCSP model speciﬁes the way in which
agents must coordinate the cultivation of GAR intentions in group activity,
and it provides the basis for resolving the conﬂicts between the singular- and
plural-stance accounts of collective intentionality.
Figure 2 sketches the CCSP model’s treatment of group decision making
and intention updating in collective activity, enabling an overview as well
as providing a framework for the more detailed discussion that follows. As
this sketch shows, a GAR intention, together with constraints introduced by
the collective-action context in which it occurs, lead an agent to commit to
participating in group decision-making processes. The group decision-making
processes themselves require not only that agents be committed to participat-
ing, but also that they have certain reasoning and communicative capabilities
and that they have well deﬁned mechanisms (or rules) for establishing group
decisions. The italicized font in the “capabilities” and “group decision-making
mechanisms” boxes is used to distinguish the separate situation for people,
who come readily equipped with such capabilities and are able to function with
informal decision processes, from the situation for computer agents, which re-
7quire computational subsystems for reasoning and communication as well as
formally speciﬁed decision-making mechanisms that are amenable to auto-
mated reasoning algorithms. The result of a group decision-making process
is the establishment of a group decision. In the context of collective activity,
a group decision is an agreement that involves the making of a choice (e.g.,
choosing a recipe or allocating a task to an agent or subgroup). As such, a
group decision entails obligations on the participants. In particular, each agent
is obliged to adopt new intentions or modify existing intentions to be in accor-
dance with the group decision. Typically, agents respond to such obligations
by adopting new intentions or modifying their existing intentions.
Regardless of the particular issue at stake, all group decisions have certain
characteristics in common. The CCSP model makes the commonalities clear
and explicit by treating all group decisions uniformly. The advantages of this
approach include the following: (1) the source of an agent’s commitment to
engage in group decision-making mechanisms (for any type of decision prob-
lem) is derived from general constraints on collective activity which, in turn,
leads to a simpler speciﬁcation of such commitments; (2) the diﬀerences among
group decisions are characterized in terms of the diﬀerent sets of intention up-
dates normally associated with each kind of group decision; and (3) the formal
speciﬁcation of mechanisms for generating group decisions may be abstracted
away from the semantics of group decisions. These important features of the
CCSP model are described further below.
The remainder of this section presents the CCSP model and the architecture
based on it. Section 3.1 explains the source of agents’ commitments to group
decision-making processes. Section 3.2 describes the essential diﬀerences in the
reasoning–choosing–updating cycle as it occurs in collective activity as com-
pared with single-agent activity. Section 3.3 speciﬁes the obligations entailed
by group decisions. Section 3.4 revisits the decision-making ﬂow sketched in
Figure 2 to provide a more complete picture of the dynamics of intentions in
collective activity using the concepts developed in Sections 3.1–3.3. Section 3.5
then discusses the formal speciﬁcation of group decision-making mechanisms
in the context of the CCSP model. Section 3.6 presents an architecture for a
collaboration-capable agent based on the CCSP model.
3.1 The Commitment to Participating in Group Decision-Making Processes
In purely single-agent activity, an agent’s intention to do some action αi en-
tails a commitment to engage in certain planning activity. 3 This commit-
ment derives directly from the axiomatic requirement that an agent’s plan be
3 When it is important to distinguish single-agent (or individual) actions from
multi-agent (or group) actions, we use subscripts: i for individual, g for group.
8means-end coherent [2]. The agent must have or be committed to determining
a recipe for αi. Although the agent may involve others in the reasoning phase
of its decision-making process—for instance if they can help it construct a
recipe—the decisions (i.e., the choices in the choosing phase) are the agent’s
own.
In collective activity, each agent holds a GAR intention “that we do αg”
(Clause 1 of Figure 1), and, in this situation too, the requirement that an
agent’s intentions be means-end coherent entails a commitment toward deci-
sion making. However, the collective-activity context imposes two additional
constraints: the common-content constraint (CCC) and the coordinated-cultiva-
tion requirement (CCR).
• Common-Content Constraint (CCC): The GAR intentions held by the
participants in a collective, group activity that are related to that activity
must all have the same content.
• Coordinated-Cultivation Requirement (CCR): The participants in a col-
lective, group activity must update their GAR intentions related to that
activity only in accordance with decisions of the group.
It is important to recognize the essentially diﬀerent nature of these constraints.
The CCC constrains the content of GAR intentions, requiring uniformity in
their content. The CCR constrains the way in which changes may be made to
GAR intentions. Thus, the CCC is a static constraint whereas the CCR is a
dynamic one.
Violating the CCC makes a group’s plan incoherent. If one agent intends
“that we cook dinner today at seven o’clock” while another intends “that we
cook dinner tomorrow at nine o’clock”, then (at least on the basis of these
intentions) these two agents will not act collectively; they will not cook dinner
together. However, the CCC by itself is not suﬃcient, because the content of
GAR intentions will not remain uniform if updating is not done “in sync.” It
is this synchronizing of updating that the CCR ensures.
Thus, the CCR (operating on the dynamic aspect of intentions) ensures the
persistence of the common-content property as a group’s plan evolves over
time. It explicitly rules out an agent’s unilaterally updating its GAR inten-
tions, with the term “unilateral” applying not only to individual participants,
but also to proper subgroups. According to the CCSP model, agents who do
not adhere to both constraints do not meet the conditions of collaborative
activity. The two constraints working in concert are required for agents to
coordinate the cultivation of their GAR intentions.
Means-end coherence requires an agent to eventually update its GAR inten-
tions, but the CCR only allows updates in accordance with decisions of the
9group. As a result, an agent’s commitment to decision making—which is in-
herent in any action-related intention—is transformed by the collective-action
context into a commitment to participate in group decision-making processes.
3.2 Dynamics of Single-Agent and Collective Activity: Essential Diﬀerences
The CCC and CCR highlight two essential diﬀerences between single-agent
and group activity with respect to the reasoning–choosing–updating cycle.
First, the two kinds of activity diﬀer in terms of the locus of control in the
choosing and updating phases. Second, they diﬀer with respect to whether
the entire cycle is primarily an internal, mental activity or has essential social
components. We consider each of these diﬀerences in turn, for each looking
ﬁrst at individual activity and then at the situation for participants in group
activities.
In the case of single-agent activity, the locus of control for all means-ends rea-
soning, decision making and intention updating is the (single) agent perform-
ing the action. For instance, in the salad-making example, the cook decides
where to get his tomatoes and then updates his plan to include obtaining
tomatoes from that source. Although various considerations of other people
may play a role in his reasoning, the decision is his. Once he has made a choice,
he simply updates his intention in accordance with his decision. Were he not
to do so, he would be considered to be irrational or otherwise to lack typical
reasoning capabilities.
In group activity, the locus of control is the group. Although responsibility for
decision making is typically distributed, intention updating requires coordi-
nation on the part of all participants. Agents may reason separately, and in a
distributed fashion, but they must eventually choose collectively. Furthermore,
as described in Section 3.1, the actual change in their intentions is constrained
by the group context. In eﬀect, the CCC and CCR enable the group to ex-
ert inﬂuence over each participant’s internal intention-update process, rather
than its being solely under the agent’s own control. Even in organizations with
rigid command structures, where the reasoning and choosing is left to a team
leader, the rest of the agents must nonetheless abide by that leader’s choices
when updating their intentions. More generally, and crucially, collaborating
agents must coordinate the updating of their GAR intentions. Were a par-
ticipant in such an activity not to adhere to this stricture, that participant
would be considered uncooperative or in some other way to be violating social
norms. 4
4 As much work in economics argues, what is individually rational may, in fact,
not be best for the group, and social norms are sometimes introduced to aﬀect the
balance between individual and group good.
10In short, in the case of individual activity, a single agent typically controls
all phases of the reasoning–choosing–updating cycle, and intention updating
follows rules of individual utility and rationality. In contrast, in the case of
group activity, intention updating is constrained by various social norms, ex-
pectations, and constraints.
In the single-agent case, typically the entire reasoning–choosing–updating cy-
cle is internal to the agent. In particular, choosing and updating are both
internal, mental actions that are very tightly coupled; the choosing directly
eﬀects the intention updating. 5 An individual’s decision is a mental action
whereby an agent (internally) commits itself to some state of aﬀairs, and in-
dividual decisions typically involve the immediate adoption of new intentions
or modiﬁcation of existing intentions.
In contrast, in the group case, even though the end result of a group decision
also typically involves the adoption of new intentions or the modiﬁcation of
existing intentions by the participants, there is a much clearer dividing line
between the choosing and updating phases. The choosing phase is an external,
or social, act, and only the updating is internal, or mental. 6 The CCSP model
requires that a group decision-making mechanism (as described in Section 3.5)
be speciﬁed for the social, choosing phase of the cycle, to reﬂect this key
characteristic. For people, the decision-making mechanism might be informal;
for instance, two friends might establish their decision to drive to NY together
by making certain declarations and shaking hands (to “seal the deal”). Once
made, a group decision establishes a new fact, external to the members of the
group (i.e., not simply elements of their mental states), namely the proposition
that the group has decided thus-and-so. For instance, the proposition that “the
group has decided to drive to NY together” becomes true if a group makes that
decision. Of course, in addition to the external fact, each of the participants
in the group has a set of beliefs related to the decision, including ones about
the decision itself.
In the CCSP model, the updating phase is coordinated by obligations. A group
decision is an agreement which, like any agreement, entails certain obligations.
These obligations typically lead the participants to adopt new intentions or to
update their existing GAR intentions to be in accordance with that decision.
The actual updating is an internal, mental activity of each individual; however,
as a result of all of the participants updating their GAR intentions “in sync”,
the distributed set of such updated GAR intentions may be seen to be the
group correlate to the internal sense of updating in the individual case.
5 These mental actions may be supported by external, physical actions. For in-
stance, the agent might ﬂip a coin or ask someone else to tell him what to do.
6 Singh [44] has highlighted the importance of distinguishing the social and mental
aspects of commitments.
113.3 Decisions and Obligations
Diﬀerent kinds of group decisions engender diﬀerent types of obligations. For
example, when a group GR makes a group decision to form a new collaborative
team for doing some activity α, each member of GR becomes obliged to adopt
a new GAR intention (“that GR does α”) and, furthermore, to constrain the
updating of that GAR intention as stipulated by the CCR. However, such
other kinds of group decisions as selecting a recipe and deciding which agent
will do a particular sub-act occur in the context of existing GAR intentions
and yield revisions to them.
Decisions about which agent will do a sub-act (or, task), which are typically
called “task-allocation decisions”, are a special case in that they require not
only the updating of GAR intentions, but also the adoption of new, subsidiary
intentions. For example, when a task βi is assigned to an agent G, that agent
must adopt a subsidiary intention to do βi. Crucially, this new intention is
not subject to the CCR, because the action is an action which agent G alone
is doing, and, as a result, G is the only relevant decision maker. However,
the other agents in the group must adopt subsidiary intentions whose content
may be glossed as “that G is able to do βi.” 7 Such intentions ensure that the
other agents do not hamper G’s eﬀorts to do βi and may lead those agents
to oﬀer collaborative support [17]. Similarly, when allocating a task βg to a
subgroup SG, the members of SG must form a collaborative team whose goal
is that they do βg. In particular, each member of SG must adopt a subsidiary
GAR intention (“that we [i.e., SG] do βg”). This new GAR intention is, of
course, also subject to the CCR: it may be updated only in accordance with
decisions made by the subgroup SG. Thus, the allocation of tasks to agents
or subgroups includes the delegation of decision-making authority.
Figure 3 lists the obligations entailed by each of a core class of group deci-
sions that arise in collaborative group activity, including decisions to establish
a new collaborative group or to coordinate the updating of related GAR in-
tentions in an existing collaboration. The parameter-binding, recipe-selection
and task-allocation decisions oblige the participants to update their relevant
GAR intentions. 8 In the ﬁgure, the particular updates are speciﬁed by giving
the relevant portion of the content of the GAR intentions both before and
7 See the original SharedPlans formalization [16] for the rationale for the “able to”
formulation.
8 Pasula [35] highlighted the need for participants in a group activity to coordinate
their decisions about action parameters, especially those that might be used across
sub-acts being done by diﬀerent agents; Hadad [21] addressed the need for coordi-
nation with respect to temporal constraints. The treatment here is not only more
general, allowing both kinds of decisions to be handled uniformly, but also explicitly
represents the social obligation aspect of intention-update in collective activity.
12after the group decision. For task-allocation decisions, the subsidiary inten-
tions that the participants are obliged to adopt are derived directly from the
SharedPlans speciﬁcations. In line with the discussion above and the original
SharedPlans formalization, the intentions adopted by the agent(s) to whom a
task is allocated and those adopted by the rest of the agents in the group are
diﬀerent.
It is important to note that the CCSP is not limited to the types of group
decisions shown in Figure 3, but rather the model provides for the uniform
treatment of a wide variety of group decisions. For example, agents seeking to
coordinate their activities in the presence of temporal constraints may need
to add new temporal constraints to their GAR intentions [23]. Such decisions
would oblige the participants to update the content of their GAR intentions
to reﬂect the decisions made about timing.
Finally, the CCSP model also accommodates another important aspect of
group decision making, namely, that decisions about group activities are fre-
quently interdependent and, thus, agents may need to combine multiple, re-
lated decisions. For example, the result of a lengthy multi-agent negotiation
might be a bundle of interdependent task-allocation and parameter-binding
decisions. In the CCSP model, the set of obligations entailed by a bundle of
decisions is simply the union of the sets of obligations individually entailed by
the decisions in that bundle.
3.4 Dynamics Revisited
The CCSP approach to group decision making in collective activity, as previ-
ously illustrated in Figure 2, explains the way in which agents holding GAR
intentions constrained by the CCR become committed to participating in
group decision-making mechanisms. Subsequent participation in such mech-
anisms typically leads to the establishment of group decisions which, being
agreements, entail certain obligations on the participants. Group decisions to
select a recipe, bind a parameter or allocate a task entail obligations on par-
ticipants to update their existing GAR intentions. Task-allocation decisions
additionally entail obligations on participants to adopt new, subsidiary in-
tentions. Since these subsidiary intentions may involve further commitments
to decision-making processes and intention updating, the typical result is a
complex hierarchy of intentions which, together with related mutual beliefs,
constitute the group’s SharedPlan. Figure 4 illustrates a participant’s view of
this hierarchy.
As described in Section 3.3 the subsidiary intentions come in three varieties.
First, when a task βg is allocated to a subgroup SG, each agent in that sub-
13• Group Decision to Form a Team GR to do α Collaboratively:
Obligations: Each agent is obliged to adopt a new GAR intention (con-
strained by the CCR) “that GR does α.”
• Group Decision to Bind a Parameter p to the value v:
Precondition: Prior GAR intention contains an unbound parameter p.
Obligations: Each agent is obliged to update its GAR intention by
replacing all occurrences of p by v.
• Group Decision to Select a Recipe Rα with sub-acts β1,...,βn:
Precondition: Prior GAR intention includes “that GR does α.”
Obligations: Each agent is obliged to update its GAR intention to in-
clude “that some agent or subgroup does β1, ..., and that
some agent or subgroup does βn.”
• Group Decision to Allocate a Sub-Act βi to an Agent G:
Precondition: Prior GAR intention includes “that some agent or sub-
group does βi.”
Obligations: Each agent is obliged to update its GAR intention to in-
clude “that G does βi.”
G is obliged to adopt a new, subsidiary intention to do βi.
Each agent other than G is obliged to adopt a new inten-
tion that G be able to do βi.
• Group Decision to Allocate a Sub-Act βg to a Subgroup SG:
Precondition: Prior GAR intention includes “that some agent or sub-
group does βg.”
Obligations: Each agent is obliged to update its GAR intention to in-
clude “that SG does βg.”
Each agent in SG is obliged to adopt a new, subsidiary
GAR intention (constrained by the CCR with respect to
the subgroup SG) “that SG does βg.”
Each agent not in SG is obliged to adopt a new intention
“that SG be able to do βg.”
Fig. 3. The obligations entailed by group decisions
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Fig. 4. A participant’s view of the dynamics of a hierarchical SharedPlan
group is obliged to adopt a GAR intention “that SG does βg”, which is subject
to the CCR with respect to that subgroup. Just as the agents in GR coor-
dinate the cultivation of their GAR intentions concerning αg, the agents in
SG coordinate the cultivation of their GAR intentions concerning βg. Second,
when a task βi is allocated to an individual G, that agent typically adopts
a subsidiary intention to do βi, in which case G is individually responsible
for completing its subplan for βi. 9 Finally, whether a task is allocated to an
individual or a subgroup, the rest of the agents in the group are obliged to
adopt subsidiary intentions that the selected individual or subgroup be able
to do the assigned task.
9 The incremental reﬁnement of single-agent subplans has been thoroughly ad-
dressed in the literature and will not be discussed further here.
15To summarize, the process of incrementally completing a plan by moving from
a set of GAR intentions constrained by the CCR, to a new group decision, to
updated GAR intentions and newly adopted subsidiary intentions is recursive.
The recursion stops when all intentions in the hierarchy have been fully spec-
iﬁed and the single-agent actions associated with intentions at the bottom of
the hierarchy have all been successfully executed (i.e., when the SharedPlan
is complete).
The entire process is typically initiated by a group decision to form a collabo-
rative group to do some αg. However, as Bratman [3] has argued, collaborative
activity may also arise spontaneously without any initiating agreement or mu-
tual obligations. The CCSP model’s characterization of collaborative activity
in terms of GAR intentions and the coordinated cultivation requirement is
consistent with Bratman’s view. However, this paper focuses on collective ac-
tivity initiated by an explicit group decision.
3.5 Group Decision-Making Mechanisms
As observed earlier, the CCSP model’s uniform treatment of group decisions
allows the semantics of group decisions to be distinguished from the mech-
anisms used to generate group decisions. This section addresses the formal
speciﬁcation of such mechanisms.
People are quite adept at using informal mechanisms for establishing group
decisions. For example, Bill and Ted might come to an agreement by nod-
ding their heads and winking meaningfully. However, computer agents, which
use automated reasoning systems, require formally speciﬁed mechanisms for
establishing group decisions. 10 Thus, the CCSP model requires that group
decision-making mechanisms (GDMMs) be formally speciﬁed to enable agents
to reliably establish group decisions for the purpose of coordinating the updat-
ing of their GAR intentions. However, to increase agent ﬂexibility, the model
leaves open the particular kinds of GDMMs agents might use to generate
group decisions in any given circumstance.
Diﬀerent GDMMs may operate in very diﬀerent ways. For example, a Unani-
mous Consent mechanism might generate a group decision only if every par-
ticipant explicitly accepts a given proposal. Alternatively, a mechanism for
allocating tasks might take the form of an auction. With some GDMMs, the
parties to a group decision may always learn of the generation of a new deci-
sion simultaneously; with others, they may learn of a new decision at diﬀerent
10 Of course, even people employ formal mechanisms for generating group decisions
when the stakes are high (e.g., as when a buyer, a seller, their attorneys, and a bank
together agree to the conditions for the sale of a house).
16times. However, all of the agents must eventually be able to verify that a group
decision has in fact been established.
In previous work [24], we argued that the speciﬁcation of a GDMM must
include (1) the possible inputs an agent can make into the mechanism; (2)
the conditions under which agents may make those inputs; (3) rules for de-
termining which combinations of agent inputs establish group decisions; and
(4) a method for making the new decision known to all the members of the
group. We presented a general framework for formally specifying GDMMs us-
ing Dynamic Deontic Linear Time Temporal Logic (DDLTLB) [9, 10]. In that
work, agent inputs into a mechanism are in the form of declarative speech-
acts [1, 43]. The conditions under which certain inputs are allowed, the rules
for how certain combinations of inputs establish group decisions, and the re-
sulting obligations are all easily expressed in DDLTLB. We illustrated the use
of that framework by specifying a sample Unanimous Consent mechanism and
proved theorems characterizing the robustness and reliability of that mecha-
nism.
In a related paper [25], we presented an auction-based mechanism that agents
can use when faced with some proposed group activity to decide whether to
initiate a collaborative eﬀort. That mechanism, which can also be used to gen-
erate bundles of task-allocation decisions for a pre-existing collaborative eﬀort,
allows the participants to protect any private, pre-existing commitments they
might have by including temporal constraints in their bids. Elsewhere [24], we
have provided algorithms that agents can use to facilitate the bid-generation
process needed to participate in such mechanisms.
3.6 The CCSP Agent Architecture
The CCSP architecture for a collaboration-capable agent, depicted in Fig-
ure 5, extends the IRMA architecture for resource-bounded agents developed
by Bratman, Israel, and Pollack [4]. In the ﬁgure, ovals represent collections of
information (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions, decisions or obligations) loosely
referred to as “databases”, whereas boxes represent computational modules
that process the information in those databases. We use the term “compo-
nent” to refer to either databases or computational modules. The solid arrows
represent the ﬂow of control from a computational module to a database; the
dashed arrows represent the ﬂow of information from a database to a com-
putational module. The components of the IRMA architecture appear on the
left side of the ﬁgure; additions for collective activity appear on the right.
The IRMA architecture addressed the ways in which means-ends reasoning
and the weighing of alternative courses of action interact when agents are
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Fig. 5. The CCSP Architecture for a Collaboration-Capable Agent
resource bounded. It deals with the dynamics of intentions for single-agent
activities. In particular, its design embodies the constraining roles of plans
and intentions. New opportunities, whether internally or externally generated,
and options generated by means-ends reasoning processes are ﬁltered for com-
patibility with existing plans and intentions. This ﬁltering process eliminates
options for future activity that would conﬂict with existing intentions, re-
ﬂecting the focusing eﬀect of plans (which is necessary because agents are
resource bounded), but it allows an agent to change its mind should a new,
high-priority option arrive. As a result, an agent’s partial plans are reﬁned
by means-ends reasoning, but in ways that are compatible with the full set
of active intentions and plans. An agent is committed to what “it is doing”
and the “characteristic roles” of those commitments are to drive means-ends
reasoning and to constrain the set of options that the agent considers [2].
The IRMA architecture reﬂects the tight link between the choosing and intention-
updating phases in single-agent activity that was described in Section 3.2. In
particular, single-agent decisions are not explicitly represented in the IRMA
architecture.
To extend this architecture to treat collaborative, group activities requires
adding components to handle an agent’s participation in complex group decision-
18making processes. These new components reﬂect that agents not only are re-
source bounded, but also, when acting collaboratively, are constrained by the
CCR from making certain decisions unilaterally and, in addition, that group
decisions oblige agents to adopt new intentions or update existing intentions.
Group decisions and their corresponding obligations are explicitly represented
on the “group activity” side of the architecture making explicit the important
distinction between the social act of choosing and the internal, mental act
of updating one’s intentions. Furthermore, whereas the “individual activity”
side of the architecture contains a single “Deliberation” module, the “group
activity” side contains both a “GDMM Manager” and a “Group-Activity In-
tention Updater.” The “GDMM Manager” handles the agent’s interactions
with other agents as they deliberate together to reﬁne their partial plans and
further specify their GAR intentions. The “Group-Activity Intention Updater”
meets obligations by adopting new intentions or updating existing intentions.
To further illustrate the roles of the new components and their operation dur-
ing the evolution of a typical collaborative plan, we will use the example of a
group of musicians collaborating to perform a concert (or “gig”). The “Group-
Activity Opportunity Analyzer” is responsible for generating new candidates
for collaborative group activity by monitoring the database of beliefs (which
includes beliefs arising from incoming communication or other perception of
the external environment). For example, an agent might learn of a new op-
portunity for playing a gig from an incoming email message. When such an
opportunity is generated, it is sent to the “Filtering re: Group Activities”
module which determines whether that option would be compatible with the
other activities that the agent is already engaged in, which are represented in
the database labeled “Intentions Structured into Plans.” For instance, if the
agent is already scheduled to play a gig on Friday night, an opportunity to
play another gig that same night on the other side of the country would prob-
ably be discarded. However, the “Filter Override” module can allow certain
high-priority opportunities to survive the ﬁltering process even if they might
conﬂict with an agent’s pre-existing commitments.
The group-related compatibility and override ﬁlters diﬀer from those concern-
ing purely single-agent activities by possibly taking into account the prefer-
ences and obligations not only of the agent, but also of other participants or
the group as a whole. The process of reconciling potential conﬂicts among
intentions is more complex in the context of group activities because it re-
quires the weighing of trade-oﬀs between individual and group good [18, 19].
For instance, an agent might determine that the needs of the group were suf-
ﬁciently great that it should reconsider its personal intention that led to a
compatibility conﬂict.
If the new opportunity survives the ﬁltering process, the “GDMM Manager”
uses the“GDMM Protocols and Rules” database, which includes the speciﬁ-
19cations of all of the mechanisms known to the agent, to select a particular
GDMM and initiate a group decision-making process using that GDMM. For
example, the agent might decide to use a Unanimous Consent mechanism and
send an email message to its fellow musicians proposing that they agree to play
this new gig on Friday night. The newly initiated mechanism is referred to as
an “instance” of a GDMM and is recorded in the “Active GDMM Instances”
database.
Replies from other agents (“incoming communication”) enter the “Beliefs”
database and are processed by the “GDMM Manager” which updates the sta-
tus of the GDMM instance in the “Active GDMM Instances” database. If
all the other agents agree, then the agent who originated the proposal an-
nounces the group decision (“outgoing communication”) and records it in
its own “Group Decisions and Obligations” database. Participation in mecha-
nisms initiated by other agents are handled similarly, except that the “GDMM
Manager” might learn of the group’s decision from an announcement made by
another agent.
Group decisions to engage in new group activities typically lead the“Group-
Activity Intention Updater” to create a new GAR intention and enter it into
the database of “Intentions Structured Into Plans”. When all of the agents in
the group have adopted corresponding GAR intentions, each constrained by
the CCR, the group is, for the ﬁrst time, in the state of having a SharedPlan.
The new GAR intention requires that certain decisions be made (e.g., how to
get to the gig and what equipment to bring). As in the single-agent case, the
“Means-Ends Reasoner” generates potential solutions to such decision prob-
lems. However, in the multi-agent case, these potential solutions may involve
actions to be performed with or by other agents (e.g., Bill and I borrow a car
or Charlie brings the high-powered equipment). Each potential solution must
be ﬁltered to ensure that any action to be performed by this agent, whether in-
dividually or with others, is compatible with its existing intentions and plans.
Each potential solution that survives this ﬁlter is sent to the “GDMM Man-
ager”, which determines possible communications the agent might make to
the rest of the group (in the context of a GDMM) to get them to consider
that potential solution.
When the agent learns from other agents about new group decisions, the
agent’s “GDMM Manager” records the new decision (e.g., to rent a van) and
associated obligations into the “Group Decisions and Obligations” database.
Such obligations typically lead the “Group Activity Intention Updater” to
enter new intentions into the database of “Intentions Structured into Plans” or
to update intentions already in that database. In the case of a task-allocation
decision, say, “Bob to drive van”, the updater enters new, subsidiary intentions
concerning the driving of the van. If “Bob” refers to this agent, then the
20intention is an intention to drive the van, which may lead to subsidiary single-
agent planning activity (on the left side of the diagram). If “Bob” refers to a
diﬀerent agent, then the new intention is an intention that “Bob” be able to
drive the van. 11
4 Discussion and Related Work
The CCSP model draws on and contributes to two diﬀerent, but complemen-
tary areas, one related to the features of the model itself and the second to the
architecture based on it. In this section, we ﬁrst show that the CCSP model
satisﬁes the requirements for an account of collective intentionality argued for
by others, including both plural- and singular-stance approaches. In particular,
it meets the plural-stance approaches’ criteria through the use of constraints
on intention updating (represented in the CCC and CCR), rather than through
the introduction of a new kind of plural-subject intentional attitude. We then
compare the CCSP-based architecture to alternative collaborative multi-agent
architectures.
Tuomela [48] argues that collaborating agents employ a we-mode of intending
that is diﬀerent from and not reducible to the ordinary I-mode of intending.
For example, he claims that in the group case, “the goal state or event comes
about due to the collective eﬀort by, or at least under the collective guidance
of, the group members.” Elsewhere [50] he stipulates that we-intenders must
be disposed to engage in certain forms of practical reasoning, for example,
to derive their individual contributions to the collaborative activity; and that
collaborating agents require a “socially-existing authority system” (or group-
will formation system) and must be motivated to use it. The CCSP model,
though its use of GAR intentions constrained by the CCC and CCR, meets
all of these requirements. Furthermore, it highlights the CCR as the source
of an agent’s motivation to participate in group decision-making mechanisms,
provides criteria for formally specifying such mechanisms, and speciﬁes the
particular obligations that are entailed by several common types of group
decisions.
Searle [42] argues that “the notion of a we-intention, of collective intention-
ality, implies the notion of cooperation [italics his].” The following features of
the CCSP model handle crucial elements of Searle’s account: (1) an agent’s
motivation to participate in group decision-making processes; (2) the group’s
coordinated updating of corresponding GAR intentions; (3) the persistence
11 Because the cultivation of this latter form of intention is not the focus of this
paper, such intentions are not shown in the database of “Intentions Structured into
Plans”.
21of the common-content property and, thus, the coherence of a group’s evolv-
ing SharedPlan; and (4) the commitment of agents to avoid interfering with
the eﬀorts of their fellow participants. In addition, hierarchical SharedPlans
represent the relationships between GAR intentions and subsidiary plans, in-
cluding in settings in which the higher-level intention is cooperative while the
lower-level intentions are competitive (as happens, for example, in organized
sports).
Searle also argues that it is important to be able to distinguish a set of agents
acting as a collective from their acting as individuals who just happen to ac-
complish the same goal. He presents as an example the case of a group of
agents collectively intending to run to a common point from the case of a set
of agents each independently intending to run to that same point. The CCSP
model handles this distinction through its requirement in the collective case
that each agent have a GAR intention (“that we run to the common point”)
and a derivative intention (“to run to the common point”) that is correctly
linked to this GAR intention. In addition, each agent’s GAR intention is sub-
ject to the CCR, which ensures the coherence of the collective intention. Searle
also argues that it is important to be able to distinguish cases where the con-
tent of the collective intentionality (“we are running a pass play”) is diﬀerent
from the content of derivative intentions (“I am blocking the defensive end”).
The CCSP model accommodates this distinction with the same mechanism: I
intend “that we run a pass play” and I have a subsidiary intention “to block
the defensive end.”
Finally, Searle presents two versions of a Business School scenario that he
claims form a counter-example to any account of collective intentionality based
solely on ordinary, singular-subject intentions (which he calls “I-intentions”).
In the scenario, graduates of the Business School have learned that they may
help humanity by pursuing their own selﬁsh interests. In the ﬁrst version,
each graduate “intends to pursue his own selﬁsh interests without reference to
anybody else”, whereas in the second version, the graduates “form a pact to
the eﬀect that they will all go out together and help humanity by way of each
pursuing his own selﬁsh interests.” The CCSP model, like the SharedPlans
formalization on which it is based, distinguishes these two versions by whether
or not the graduates all have GAR intentions “that we help humanity by each
pursuing our own selﬁsh interests.” As described in an earlier paper [13], the
SharedPlans formalization has mechanisms that handle additional features of
these scenarios argued for by Searle.
Gilbert [12] argues that any model of collective intentionality (or “shared
intention”) must account for the following features: (1) that shared intentions
entail certain obligations (e.g., “not to act contrary to the shared intention” or
“to promote the fulﬁllment of the shared intention”), as well as corresponding
rights and entitlements; (2) that participants in a shared intention “are not
22in a position to remove its constraints unilaterally”; and (3) “that there could
be a shared intention to do such-and-such though none of the participants
personally intend to conform their behavior to the shared intention.” The
CCSP model handles the ﬁrst feature through its requirement that group
decisions entail certain obligations, in particular, obligations to update existing
GAR intentions or to adopt related subsidiary intentions. Through the CCR
constraint against the unilateral updating of GAR intentions, the CCSP model
has the second feature. We have not attempted to capture the third feature,
because it does not accord with our conception of collective intentionality.
Bratman [3] presents a model of Shared Cooperative Activity that employs
ordinary, singular-subject intentions, but with the highly specialized content:
“that we J in accordance with and because of [our intentions] and meshing
subplans of [our intentions].” In contrast, GAR intentions in the CCSP model
have the much simpler content, “that we do α”, but their updating is con-
strained by the CCR. This separation of the content of an intention from
constraints on how that content can be updated enables the CCSP agent ar-
chitecture to employ essentially the same means-ends reasoner used in the
single-agent case, while adding a new module—the “GDMM Manager”— to
handle the deliberation and communication processing required to manage the
agent’s participation in group decision-making mechanisms.
A wide-range of multi-agent systems architectures and coordination mech-
anisms have been developed to enable the construction of computer systems
that function like members of a team carrying out a joint activity [11, 26, 46, 8,
inter alia]. In the context of this paper, which has focused on the central role
of the dynamics of intention in an explanation of collective intentionality, the
most relevant architectures are those based on previous models and formal-
izations of collaboration and teamwork, GRATE∗ [26] and STEAM [46].
GRATE∗’s architecture is based on the “Joint Responsibility” model of collab-
orative activity, an extension of Joint Intentions [30] that includes a require-
ment that collaborating agents be committed to an agreed-upon “solution” to
their joint activity—where a solution includes a recipe (i.e., a set of tasks) plus
a complete set of task assignments. As a result, the GRATE∗ agent architec-
ture incorporates protocols for recipe selection and task allocation. However,
like the Joint Intentions formalization on which it builds, GRATE∗ does not
address a group’s incremental reﬁnement of their partial plan. STEAM, which
draws on both the Joint Intentions and SharedPlans formalizations, incorpo-
rates similar constituents through its use of the SharedPlans-speciﬁcation re-
quirements that agents be committed to choosing recipes and assigning agents
to sub-acts in those recipes. Each of these systems also addresses various prob-
lems that arise in going from the formalizations to implementations. For in-
stance, STEAM incorporates decision-theoretic mechanisms for deciding when
it is worthwhile for an agent to communicate [46].
23These systems treat only particular types of group decisions, and they treat
each type separately. The lack of a general treatment of group decision making
is not surprising, because the theories on which these systems were based also
did not explicitly represent the complex relationships between group decisions,
their entailed obligations and the intentions that participants modify or adopt
in response to them. In describing the development of STEAM, Tambe [47, p.
90] remarks on the importance of the formalizations of collaboration saying,
“In the absence of both the explicit representation of team goals and plans,
as well as commitments and responsibilities they engender, agents are often
forced to rely on the problematic domain-speciﬁc coordination plans, leading
to ... teamwork failures.” The architecture presented in this paper is the ﬁrst to
identify group decision making as a general, pervasively needed capability; to
represent explicitly the obligations group decisions entail; and, by embodying
the CCC and CCR constraints, to link decision making and intention updating
explicitly. It is based on the CCSP model, which is the kind of formalization
to which Tambe refers, and it thus provides the basis for more general and
robust collaboration-capable agents similar to the way in which the IRMA
architecture provides a basis for resource-bounded single-agent systems.
5 Conclusions
This paper deﬁnes the Coordinated Cultivation of SharedPlans (CCSP) model
of the dynamics of intention in collaborative activity. Through its augmenta-
tion of the SharedPlans formalization with the common-content constraint
and coordinated cultivation requirement, speciﬁcation of an explicit role for
obligations in mediating between group decisions and intention update, and
the requirement that group decision-making mechanisms be formally speci-
ﬁed, the model makes explicit the connection between group decisions and
intention update in collective, group activity. This integrated treatment of
group decision making and intention updating provides the basis for deﬁn-
ing a more general architecture for collaboration-capable agents. The paper
deﬁnes such an architecture, extending the standard IRMA architecture for
resource-bounded agents to be an architecture for resource-bounded agents
capable of acting collaboratively.
Prior characterizations of collective intentionality from both the singular- and
plural-stances have considered only static properties of intentions, essentially
asking what the content of these intentions should be. Their concerns have
been essentially equivalent to only one of the two constraints in the CCSP
model, the common-content constraint. This paper has argued that the dy-
namics of intentions play a central role in collective intentionality. The sec-
ond CCSP constraint, the coordinated cultivation requirement, is essential for
there to be maintenance of the common-content property. By having both con-
24straints, the CCSP enables an explanation of collective intentionality that rests
on purely singular-stance constructs while capturing the essential properties
argued for in accounts taking the plural stance. It thus resolves a long-standing
debate about the nature of intentions in collective group activity.
References
[1] J.L. Austin. How to do things with words. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1962.
[2] Michael E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997.
[3] Michael E. Bratman. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention
and Agency. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[4] Michael E. Bratman, David J. Israel, and Martha E. Pollack. Plans and
resource-bounded practical reasoning. Computational Intelligence, 4:349–
355, 1988.
[5] Cristiano Castelfranchi. Commitments: From individual intentions to
groups and organizations. In Lesser [29], pages 41–48.
[6] Philip R. Cohen, Hector J. Levesque, and Ira Smith. On team forma-
tion. In G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, editors, Contemporary
Action Theory, volume II, pages 87–114. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Netherlands, 1997.
[7] Philip R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack, editors. Intentions
in Communication. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990.
[8] Keith S. Decker and Victor R. Lesser. Generalizing the partial global
planning algorithm. International Journal of Intelligent Cooperative In-
formation Systems, 1(2):319–346, 1992.
[9] Frank Dignum and Hans Weigand. Communication and deontic logic. In
R. Wieringa and R. Feenstra, editors, Information Systems, Correctness
and Reusability, pages 242–260. World Scientiﬁc, 1995.
[10] Frank Dignum and Hans Weigand. Modelling communication between
cooperative systems. In Conference on Advanced Information Systems
Engineering, pages 140–153, 1995.
[11] Joseph Andrew Giampapa and Katia Sycara. Team-oriented agent coor-
dination in the retsina multi-agent system. Technical Report CMU-RI-
TR-02-34, Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,
PA, December 2002. Presented at AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Teamwork
and Coalition Formation.
[12] Margaret Gilbert. Sociality and Responsibility. Rowman & Littleﬁeld
Publishers, Inc., New York, 2000.
[13] Barbara J. Grosz. The contexts of collaboration. Cognition, Agency
and Rationality: Proceedings of the Fifth International Colloquium on
Cognitive Science (ICCS-97), pages 175–188, 1999.
25[14] Barbara J. Grosz, Luke Hunsberger, and Sarit Kraus. Planning and acting
together. AI Magazine: Special Issue on Distributed, Continual Planning,
pages 23–34, 1999.
[15] Barbara J. Grosz and Sarit Kraus. Collaborative plans for group activi-
ties. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Joint Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI-93), San Mateo, CA, USA, 1993. Morgan
Kaufmann.
[16] Barbara J. Grosz and Sarit Kraus. Collaborative plans for complex group
action. Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 86:269–357, 1996.
[17] Barbara J. Grosz and Sarit Kraus. The evolution of SharedPlans. In
Michael Wooldridge and Anand Rao, editors, Foundations of Rational
Agency, number 14 in Applied Logic Series, pages 227–262. Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1999.
[18] Barbara J. Grosz, Sarit Kraus, David G. Sullivan, and Sanmay Das. The
inﬂuence of social norms and social consciousness on intention reconcili-
ation. Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 142:147–177, 2002.
[19] Barbara J. Grosz, Sarit Kraus, and Shavit Talman. The inﬂuence of so-
cial dependencies on decision-making: Initial investigations with a new
game. In Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-2004). ACM Press,
2004.
[20] Barbara J. Grosz and Candace L. Sidner. Plans for discourse. In Cohen
et al. [7], chapter 20.
[21] Meirav Hadad. Combining Cooperative Planning and Temporal Reasoning
in Dynamic Multi-Agent Systems. PhD thesis, Bar Ilan University, Ramat
Gan, Israel, 2002.
[22] Luke Hunsberger. Making SharedPlans more concise and easier to reason
about. In Agent Architectures, Theories and Languages V, volume 1555
of Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pages 81–98. Springer-Verlag,
1999.
[23] Luke Hunsberger. Algorithms for a temporal decoupling problem in multi-
agent planning. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI-2002), 2002.
[24] Luke Hunsberger. Group Decision Making and Temporal Reasoning. PhD
thesis, Harvard University, 2002. Available as Harvard Technical Report
TR-05-02.
[25] Luke Hunsberger and Barbara J. Grosz. A combinatorial auction for
collaborative planning. In Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent
Systems (ICMAS-2000), pages 151–158. IEEE Computer Society, 2000.
[26] Nick R. Jennings. Controlling cooperative problem solving in industrial
multi-agent systems using joint intentions. Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 75:195–
240, 1995.
[27] D. Kinny, M. Ljungberg, A.S. Rao, E. Sonenberg, G. Tidhar, and
E. Werner. Planned team activity. In C. Castelfranchi and E. Werner,
editors, Artiﬁcial Social Systems, Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence.
26Springer Verlag, Amsterdam, 1994.
[28] Amy L. Lansky and Michael Georgeﬀ. Procedural knowledge. Technical
Report 411, SRI International, January 1987.
[29] Victor Lesser, editor. First International Conference on Multi-Agent Sys-
tems (ICMAS-95). The MIT Press, 1995.
[30] Hector J. Levesque, Philip R. Cohen, and Jose H. T. Nunes. On act-
ing together. In Seventh National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
volume 1, pages 94–99. AAAI Press/MIT Press, 1990.
[31] Karen E. Lochbaum. Using Collaborative Plans to Model the Intentional
Structure of Discourse. PhD thesis, Harvard University, October 1994.
[32] J.-J. Ch. Meyer, W. van der Hoek, and B. van Linder. A logical approach
to the dynamics of commitments. Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 113, 1999.
[33] Charles L. Ortiz, Jr. Introspective and elaborative processes in rational
agents. Journal of the Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
1999.
[34] Pietro Panzarasa, Nicholas Jennings, and Timothy J. Norman. Formal-
ising collaborative decision-making and practical reasoning inmulti-agent
systems. Journal of Logic and Computation, 11(6):1–63, 2001.
[35] Hanna Pasula. Design of a collaborative planning system. Seniors Honors
Thesis, Harvard University, 1996.
[36] Martha E. Pollack. Plans as complex mental attitudes. In Cohen et al.
[7], chapter 5.
[37] David V. Pynadath, Milind Tambe, Nicolas Chauvat, and Lawrence Cave-
don. Toward team-oriented programming. In Nicholas R. Jennings and
Yves Lesperance, editors, Intelligent Agents VI, Agent Theories, Archi-
tectures, and Languages, volume 1757 of Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intel-
ligence. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2000.
[38] Anand S. Rao and Michael P. Georgeﬀ. Modeling rational agents within
a BDI-architecture. In Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’91), pages 473–484, San
Mateo, CA, 1991. Kaufman.
[39] Anand S. Rao and Michael P. Georgeﬀ. An abstract architecture for
rational agents. In Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’92), pages 439–449. Mor-
gan Kaufman Publishers, Inc., 1992.
[40] Anand S. Rao and Michael P. Georgeﬀ. BDI agents: From theory to
practice. In Lesser [29], pages 312–319.
[41] Anand S. Rao and Michael P. Georgeﬀ. The semantics of intention main-
tenance for rational agents. In Proceedings of the 14th International Joint
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI-95), pages 704–710, 1995.
[42] John R. Searle. Collective intentions and action. In Cohen et al. [7].
[43] J.R. Searle. The Construction of Social Reality. Allen Lane, London,
1995.
[44] Munindar P. Singh. Agent communication languages: Rethinking the
principles. IEEE Computer, 31(12):40–47, December 1998.
27[45] SRI International. Procedural Reasoning System User’s Guide.
[46] Milind Tambe. Agent architectures for ﬂexible, practical teamwork. In
Fourteenth National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pages 22–28,
1997.
[47] Milind Tambe. Towards ﬂexible teamwork. Journal of Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence Research, 7:83–124, 1997.
[48] Raimo Tuomela. Cooperation and the we-perspective. Paper for the
conference Rationality and Commitment, St. Gallen, May 2004.
[49] Raimo Tuomela. Joint action. Invited paper for the Workshop on Holistic
Epistemology and Theory of Action, University of Leipzig, June 24-27,
2004.
[50] Raimo Tuomela. The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic
Social Notions. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1995.
28